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Abstract: At the core of this paper is a psychosocial inquiry into the Marxist concept of alienation and 
its applications to the field of digital labour. Following a brief review of different theoretical works on 
alienation, it looks into its recent conceptualisations and applications to the study of online social net-
working sites. Finally, the authors offer suggestions on how to extend and render more complex these 
recent approaches through in-depth analyses of Facebook posts that exemplify how alienation is ex-
perienced, articulated, and expressed online. For this perspective, the article draws on Rahel Jaeggi’s 
(2005) reassessment of alienation, as well as the depth-hermeneutic method of “scenic understand-
ing” developed by Alfred Lorenzer (e.g. 1970; 1986). 
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1. Introduction 
In his 2011 article “Surveillance and Alienation in the Online Economy”, Mark Andrejevic 
makes the following observation apropos alienation and the specific form that the concept 
takes on in online social networking practices.  
 
Each form of intentional user-generated content—a blog post, a Facebook update, a 
Tweet, is redoubled in the form of ‘cybernetic commodities’ (Mosco 1989). […] [W]hile 
they are created by users, they are not controlled by users, who have little choice over 
how and when this data is generated and little say in how it is used. In this sense we 
might describe the generation and use of this data as the alienated or estranged dimen-
sion of their activity. To the extent that this information can be used to predict and influ-
ence user behaviour it is an activity that returns to users in an unrecognizable form as a 
means of fulfilling the imperatives of others. (Andrejevic 2011, 286, our emphasis). 
 
This is an extremely fertile point of departure for thinking about the uses of the concept of 
alienation in the online sphere. Since our aim in this paper is to contribute to the discussion 
of alienation within the study of digital labour from a psychoanalytically oriented perspective, 
Andrejevic’s observations here are highly suggestive. He creates a scenario in which aliena-
tion arises not simply on the basis of the users’ symbolic production on a given corporate 
platform; rather, he presents the feeding back of the produced and double-used data as a 
decisive part in the dynamics of alienation. In so doing, he opens up for a complex and so-
phisticated conception of the relation between a social networking site (SNS) and its users, 
as well as the potential place of alienation within it. 
Indeed, the nuance which Andrejevic adds to his text, namely that it is not simply a prod-
uct that “returns to users” in disguise, but an activity (Andrejevic 2011, 286) moves his ob-
servation yet closer to psychodynamic thinking, where we suspect a strong connection be-
tween intra and inter-psychic processes. Thus, a psychoanalytically informed perspective is 
geared to seek out why—as well as how—we do not recognise that which returns to us us-
ers, as well as how we fare under—and suffer from—a relationship in the making of which 
we do not recognise our own hand. It is questions such as these that we want to put forth in 
this paper. 
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We will approach these questions by presenting in-depth readings of an exemplary choice 
of users’ posts to Facebook’s Site Governance Page. For these in-depth readings we will rely 
on the “depth-hermeneutic approach to cultural analysis”, which was developed by the soci-
ologist and psychoanalyst Alfred Lorenzer (1922–2002) throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
(e.g. Lorenzer and Orban 1987/88). What depth-hermeneutics offers is a theoretical and 
methodological frame for interpreting concrete articulations of and within a culture from both 
a psychoanalytic and culture-analytic angle. Depth hermeneutics places the vantage point of 
our inquiry first and foremost on the subjective, i.e. users’ symbolic production itself. The 
reading of this production as symptomatic—as subjective articulations of the objective socie-
tal conditions—will allow us to lay open the specific form of online alienation in the relations 
between the subjective and its socio-cultural context. How does alienation make itself felt in 
the production and, ultimately, in the products at the heart of the exploitative structure of 
online social networks that Andrejevic describes above?  
In order to set the stage for our inquiry we will first give a brief overview of the history of 
the concept of alienation. We will then turn to the contemporary debate on digital labour and 
the place of alienation therein. The main part of this article will consist of our exemplary anal-
yses of online alienation. 
2. A Brief History of Alienation 
Alienation holds a particularly central place in Marxist theory; after all, it is the category that 
decisively mediates between a worker’s living conditions and the relations of production, be-
tween the subject and its objects, or even between the subjective and the objective in the 
social per se.  
It is this in-between position that Marx [1844] (1988) granted alienation that made the 
concept so extremely popular in the tradition of critical thinking about culture and society. Jon 
Elster (1986) deems alienation to be “the most important concept” of Marx’s normative theory 
(Elster 1986, 41). “The efficacy of capitalist exploitation,” he writes, “rests on its ability to per-
petuate the conditions under which it appears as morally legitimate” (ibid, 56). Marcello 
Musto (2010), in turn, traces the concept’s career as the main pillar of the critique of capital-
ism’s efficacy throughout long stretches of the intellectual history of the 20th century. After the 
publication of Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts from 1844 in 1932 several 
Frankfurt School authors, as Adorno and Horkheimer (1972), Herbert Marcuse (1966), Erich 
Fromm (1961; 1965), produced Freudo-Marxist readings of alienation (Musto 2010, 83–85). 
French existentialists rendered the concept “much more generic than in Marx’s thought”, 
identifying it “with a diffuse discontent of man in society” (ibid, 86–87), and the 1960s, then, 
literally became “the age of alienation tout court” in which, 
 
authors from various political backgrounds and academic disciplines identified its causes 
as commodification, overspecialization, anomie, bureaucratization, conformism, consum-
erism, loss of a sense of self amid new technologies, even personal isolation, apathy, so-
cial or ethnic marginalization, and environmental pollution (Musto 2010, 90). 
 
In view of this “craze” it might be understandable why, at the beginning of the 21st century, 
Rahel Jaeggi (2005) can observe that the term nearly disappeared from all socio-
philosophical literature. 
 
Too inflationary was the use of the term alienation in its boom phase, too old-fashioned 
and outdated its philosophical foundations in the age of the ‘postmodern’, too questiona-
ble its political consequences in the age of ‘political liberalism’ – and probably also too 
pointless the concern of the critique of alienation under the sway of victorious capitalism. 
(Jaeggi 2005, 11).  
 
However, it was specifically developments in the online sphere, such as the increasingly mo-
nopolistic corporate structures on the World Wide Web and the orientation towards the gen-
eration of exchange value have brought the concept of alienation, together with the full set of 
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Marxist terminology, back onto the social scientific agenda. Especially media and communi-
cation scholars (Comor 2010; Andrejevic 2011, 2014; Fuchs 2012a; Fisher 2012; Giritli Ny-
gren and Gidlund 2012; Fuchs and Sevignani 2013; Sevignani 2013), have successfully re-
suscitated Marxist terminology—and specifically alienation—to examine social networking 
sites more closely. 
3. Alienation Defined 
There are two texts by Karl Marx that have proven canonical for the current critical under-
standing of alienation in digital labour. We will start with the chronologically later passage, 
which can be found in Marx’s Grundrisse [1857–61] (1973). Here, Marx writes apropos the 
“real alien relation [Fremdheit] of the worker to his product”: 
 
The material on which it [i.e. living labour capacity; S.K. and J.J.] works is alien material; 
the instrument is likewise an alien instrument […]. Indeed, living labour itself appears as 
alien vis-à-vis living labour capacity, whose labour it is, whose own life’s expression it is, 
for it has been surrendered to capital in exchange for objectified labour, for the product of 
labour itself (Marx 1857–61 [1973], 394, italics in original). 
 
Four dimensions of alienation can be identified in this passage, specifically: (1) alienation 
from the material of one’s labour, (2), alienation from the instruments, (3) alienation from the 
product(s), and (4) alienation from oneself (i.e. living labour as “alien vis-à-vis living labour 
capacity”). It is along these lines that Fuchs and Sevignani (2013) detect and list the various 
variables of alienation on online SNSs. Before turning to their article, however, we would like 
to introduce the chronologically earlier passage on alienation by Marx, which can be found in 
the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts [1844] (1956/2009). Already here Marx identified 
four dimensions of alienation; yet, his formulations here are more straightforwardly directed 
towards its relational aspects—a difference which ultimately produces different categories as 
well. Thus, one can sum up Marx’s early observations here as follows: The worker is alienat-
ed in the “relation […] to the product of labour” and in the “relation […] to the act of produc-
tion in the labour process” (Marx 1844 [1956/2009], 30–31); these two alienated relations 
have a further alienating effect, specifically that of “estranging” the worker from her/himself1 
as well as from others:  
 
What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labor and to himself, al-
so holds to a man’s relation to the other man, and to the other man’s labor and object of 
labor. […] The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man [stands] 
to himself, is realized and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to 
other men (ibid, 32). 
 
As with Andrejevic’s quotation above, Marx’s relational focus here meets the psychoanalytic 
interest of this paper; after all, if users are indeed caught up in an alienating, estranging and 
reifying relation with a corporate SNS, the foremost task is to describe in detail the character-
istics of this relation. 
In order to fully savour what the relational focus in Marx’s early statements might mean for 
an inquiry into users’ relations to a corporate online SNS it is worth taking a look at Rahel 
Jaeggi’s (2005) social-philosophical approach to alienation. Summing her own take on the 
concept up in the formula of “a relation of unrelatedness”, Jaeggi explains: “alienation does 
[…] not mean the absence of a relation, but is a relation itself—if only a deficient one” (Jaeggi 
2005, 19, our translation). She chooses Marx’s passage in the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts (1844) as her point of departure. This description of alienation, she writes,  
 
already contains both aspects, which according to my thesis are the main points of 
Marx’s discussion of alienation. Firstly, what we find as being thought together here (i.e. 
                                                
1 Marx here uses the term “species being” which can roughly be defined as the anthropological potential of a 
human being in a given historical situation (see Marx 1844 [1956/2009], 32). 
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in the field of tension between appropriation and alienness, S.K. and J.J.) are two prob-
lems: that of the ‘loss of meaning’, of impoverishment and ‘meaninglessness of the 
world’, and that of impotence and powerlessness vis-a-vis this world. Secondly, what 
shows in this central text of Marx’s theory of alienation is the specific twist that Marx adds 
to the problem of the unrelatedness between world and human being: the scandal of al-
ienation is that it is an alienation from what one has done and made oneself. It is our own 
activities and products, the social institutions and relations that we have created our-
selves, which here become an alien power (Jaeggi 2005, 29–30, our translation).  
 
Jaeggi’s understanding of the concept is valuable to our approach as she translates Marx’s 
various points into a subjective (but by no means subjectivist) state of being alienated – i.e. 
the vague and paradoxical feeling of being related to what one experiences as strange and 
the paralysing meaninglessness and powerlessness as the dominating feelings in this rela-
tionship. The particular value of this reading of Marx’s early definition of alienation for the 
field of digital labour lies in the perspective it provides for thinking Andrejevic’s observation of 
the return of one’s own activities in disguised form further. Specifically, it allows us to ask 
how the returning of the users’ activities impacts on these very users, their interactions with 
the social media platform, with each other, and their produce. In this respect, Jaeggi’s trans-
lations of Marx’s formulations into “the inability to identify meaningfully with what one does 
and with whom one does it with”, as well as “the inability to exert control over what one does” 
(Jaeggi 2005, 30) become touchstones in and for our analysis of online alienation. 
Thus equipped, let’s take a look at the debate on digital labour and the place of alienation 
within it, before turning to our own exemplary readings of online alienation. 
4. Alienation in Digital Labour 
The field of digital labour studies has seen an immense rise in popularity; in the past years 
research has tackled the relationship between users and forms of unpaid or paid digital prac-
tices that produce exchange and use value (Terranova 2000; Kücklich 2005; Mosco and 
McKercher 2007; Burston, Dyer-Witheford and Hearn, 2010, Manzerolle 2010, Comor 2010, 
Dyer-Witheford 2010; Kang and McAllister 2011; Fuchs 2010, 2012a; Fuchs and Sevignani 
2013; Scholz 2013). The argument that has been made by various scholars in the digital la-
bour debate is that many forms of online practices do not appear to be labour but, in fact, 
contribute significantly to, say, the value of a website or online game. For a number of years, 
academic writing that does not specifically subscribe to the term “digital labour” but investi-
gates “virtual work” from a critical perspective has also proliferated (e.g. Dyer-Whiteford 
2001; Greenhill and Wilson 2006; Hermann 2009; Huws 2009).2 
In order to provide a common basis upon which to build our argument, we will give a brief 
description of digital labour as it has been put forth—and defended plausibly—by Marxist 
oriented researchers, such as Christian Fuchs (e.g. 2012a). This position draws heavily on 
Dallas Smythe and his political-economic study on media audiences (1977; 1981). Smythe 
argues that what is sold in commercial media is not so much programmes to audiences, but 
audiences to advertisers. The volte of Smythe’s approach is that it is the audiences them-
selves who are turned into commodities. Advertisers pay television channels for air time in 
order to be granted access to these audiences. The bigger the audience of a specific pro-
gramme, the more money a channel can charge for its exposure to other messages. Smythe 
therefore held that the reception activity of audiences constitutes a form of unpaid labour. If 
no one would do the labour of watching a TV programme, no company would want to have 
advertisement placed on it. Watching television thus marks the unequal exchange of a televi-
sion programme for the audience’s time and attention. 
Smythe’s model becomes particularly relevant when transferred to the Internet and ap-
plied to user-generated content (Fuchs 2012a) where the central task of value production is 
“out/crowdsourced” to the users. In order to emphasise this basic conflation of the spheres of 
consumption and production on corporate online platforms, Alvin Toffler’s term of the 
                                                
2 We follow Fuchs‘s and Sevignani’s (2013, 240) definition of the term “labour” in this paper. 
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“prosumer” (1980) has been adapted to this context, signifying that the service’s user pro-
duces goods (which the service owner then commodifies) not only while consuming the ser-
vice offered but rather: by consuming this service. The products thus produced are “user-
generated data, personal data, social networks and transaction data about [users’] browsing 
behaviour and communication behaviour on corporate social media” (Fuchs 2012a, 708). 
Fuchs continues that “[c]orporate social media sell the users’ data commodity to advertising 
clients at a price that is larger than the invested constant and variable capital,” making it part-
ly the users and partly the corporations’ employees that “create the surplus value contained 
in this commodity. The difference is that the users are unpaid and therefore—in monetary 
terms—infinitely exploited” (Fuchs 2012a, 713). 
In bold strokes, these are the outlines of the dynamics of digital labour from a political 
economic perspective. Whereas the dictum of infinite exploitation is, as Fuchs cautions, lim-
ited to the monetary dimension (2012a), the point of alienation is decisively more open to 
subjective interpretations. Returning thus to alienation, Fuchs and Sevignani (2013, 257-259) 
use the four dimensions of alienation that they found in Marx’s Grundrisse (see above) in 
order to sound out its scope on Facebook, the biggest SNS online. The authors use broad, 
general categories, such as ownership, ideological coercion, instrumentalisation and com-
modification of data to outline the functional character of online alienation. Thus, users are 
alienated from themselves because they are coerced to use Facebook by way of peer pres-
sure and a lack of viable alternatives (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013, 257); users are alienated 
from “the instruments of labour” because they do not own the communication platform itself 
and because their “brains, hands, mouths, ears and speech, the Internet and platforms” are 
instrumentalised “for advertising” (ibid, 258); moreover, users are alienated from the “objects  
of labour” on Facebook—which the authors identify as shared representations of experienc-
es—“through a legally binding agreement” (ibid, 259) that makes it possible for the platform 
owners to use them for economic purposes; and finally users are alienated from the product 
of labour due to the peculiar divide between use-value and exchange-value of symbolic pro-
duce online: the “use-values that Facebook users create are at the same time commodities 
that Facebook offers for sale on a market” (ibid).  
From our perspective, the problem with such a categorical treatment of alienation is that it 
merely claims its existence theoretically instead of describing it phenomenologically. Such 
description would have to take into consideration the relational dimensions of being alienated 
in the ways outlined above. Fortunately, Fuchs and Sevignani (2013) also provide a measure 
of such phenomenological description when they introduce their concept of the “inverse fet-
ish character of the social media commodity” (2013, 261) and offer an exemplary articulation: 
“In the world of digital labour,” the authors write,  
 
the fetish character of the commodity takes on an inverted form. We can speak of an in-
verse fetish character of the social media commodity. The commodity character of Face-
book data is hidden behind the social use-value of Facebook, i.e. the social relations and 
functions enabled by platform use. The inverse fetish of Facebook is typically expressed 
in statements like ‘Facebook does not exploit me because I benefit from it by connecting 
to other users’. The object status of users, i.e. the fact that they serve the profit interests 
of Facebook, is hidden behind the social networking enabled by Facebook (Fuchs and 
Sevignani 2013, 261).  
 
In a more empirically directed study, Sebastian Sevignani (2013) elaborates along the lines 
suggested by the concept of “inverse fetishism” (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013, 261). Based on 
qualitative interviews with 30 students, he identifies “trade-off strategies between privacy 
needs and perceived user benefits” (Sevignani 2013, 332) as potential sites for “prosumer 
alienation” to become articulated. However, the author abstains from presenting concrete 
online material, but rather offers summarising interpretations: “The only thing SNS users can 
do is to limit their information disclosure no matter if they are SNS literate or not (ibid). It is at 
that point of the trade-off that Fuchs and Sevignani’s ideal example—“Facebook does not 
exploit me because I benefit from it by connecting to other users”—might be true to a certain, 
negotiated extent. 
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One more contribution needs mentioning before we turn to our depth-hermeneutic inquiry 
into exemplary cases of online alienation, specifically, that of Eran Fisher (2012). With his 
wish to highlight “the humanist aspects in Marx’s critique of capitalism and distinguish it from 
his more structural and economic critique” (2012, 173), Fisher approximates a notion of al-
ienation that is in line with Jaeggi’s and our own (lack of control; lacking ability to relate). The 
aim of his study, specifically to “highlight the contradictions of capitalism from a humanist 
viewpoint” (ibid), coincides with the present approach as well. However, the main thesis that 
Fisher puts forth on this basis seems somewhat too neat. This thesis—the existence of an 
inverse-proportional relation between exploitation and alienation—is summed up in the title of 
his paper, “How Less Alienation Creates More Exploitation?” While we find the overall direc-
tion of this argument thought provoking, Fisher’s simple equation of de-alienation with such 
suspiciously affirmative categories as “self-expression, authenticity, and relations with others” 
appears highly problematic. “[I]n order to be de-alienated,” Fisher writes, “users must com-
municate and socialize: they must establish social networks, share information, talk to their 
friends and read their posts, follow and be followed. By so doing they also exacerbate their 
exploitation” (Fisher 2012, 179). This simple acceptance of user interaction as de-alienating 
seems remarkable—especially in the face of the many piercing observations of potentially 
alienating constellations and affordances on SNSs that Fisher offers otherwise. Amongst 
these observations are: Facebook’s inherent bias towards communication (2012, 175), and 
specifically towards that of the mundane and the emotional (ibid, 177); the “position of forced 
reflexivity” that users are put into and the subsequent categorising and “rationalising of self-
disclosure” (ibid, 176), the registering and expressing of emotions “almost as they occur”, as 
well as the construction of identity through a “web of ‘Likes’” (ibid, 177). It seems to us as 
though Fisher discards these observations in an attempt to unambiguously side with the us-
ers while disregarding the other dimensions of alienation. 
Let us briefly go through our luggage and list the items that we want to take with us on the 
rest of the journey: From Andrejevic we take the dynamic of being fed back one’s own pro-
duction in disguise, from Marx’s definitions we take the four relational movements that make 
the concept (alienation from oneself, from the others, from the [means of] production, from 
the products), from Jaeggi’s reading we pack the failing act of identification and appropria-
tion, as well as the feelings of meaninglessness and powerlessness. From the various appli-
cations of the concept of alienation to digital labour, in turn, we keep in mind the diverse vari-
ables, situations and constellations in which the contributors to the field so far have detected 
possible sites, causes and effects of alienation, such as the problematic ownership relations, 
ideological coercion, instrumentalisation, inverse fetishism, trade-off strategies etc. All of the-
se considerations are framed and ordered by our overall interest in concretely describing and 
understanding the forms and patterns of (symbolic) interaction in which online alienation ar-
ticulates itself symptomatically.  
5. Scenes of Online Alienation 
Building a bridge to our approach to online alienation via Alfred Lorenzer’s method of “scenic 
understanding” (1970, 139–141), let us take one more look at Rahel Jaeggi’s remarks on 
alienation. When Jaeggi cautions other authors to be economical in their assessments of 
alienation by writing that, “a life form could be criticised as wrong without there existing the 
equivalent of a subjective perception of psychological strain” (ibid, 47), such subjective per-
ception as the point of departure for her own narrative approach becomes clear. Depth-
hermeneutics shares this starting point. In the introduction of On the Foundation of a Materi-
alist Theory of Socialisation (Zur Begründung einer materialistischen Sozialisationstheorie, 
1972), one of the central documents of Alfred Lorenzer’s project of a materialist-
psychoanalytic social science, he writes: 
 
It is the task of psychoanalysis to render more precise in content those terms that have 
been abstracted from the analysis of objective societal processes, as for example ‘aliena-
tion.’ This is done through a critical process that departs from the sensually experiencable 
suffering of the subjects. Putting into question concrete suffering in its ‘real’ genesis is 
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necessary in order to uncover in these places an ideological veiling of the subjective fac-
tor that only Freud began to tear open.3 (Lorenzer 1972, 15, our translation) 
 
Terms that were once won from concretely analysing societal processes, such as alienation, 
are to be brought in touch again with equivalent processes in an individual’s given historical 
situation. Yet, these processes are not initially approached from the side of the social condi-
tions, but, first of all, from that of the “sensually experiencable suffering of the subjects” (ibid). 
In the following, we would like to present Lorenzer’s theory and method by way of a 
demonstration, rather than explanation; in this way we hope to do justice to Lorenzer’s mate-
rialist appreciation of a practical encounter with concrete socio-cultural practice (Lorenzer 
1972, 9; Bereswill et al 2010), as well as contribute ideas and insights to the present under-
standing of online alienation. For this task, the question of how to identify and locate concrete 
articulations of alienation in everyday individual online practice becomes decisive. Therefore, 
a depth-hermeneutic inquiry into Facebook (to stay with the most common example), would 
have to depart from those realms of discourse and symbolic interaction where such concrete 
articulations become clearly perceivable—not only as subjective perceptions, but as percep-
tions relating to Facebook as the, or an Other in the interaction. What is thus at stake in a 
depth-hermeneutic inquiry is the relatedness and relation between a societal institution and 
the individuals interacting with this agency. Arguably, this is the case on the Facebook Site 
Governance page that the platform introduced in 2009.4 Here users are invited to discuss, 
and in some cases vote on changes in the programming and user policies (Fuchs and 
Sevignani 2013, 258). Entering into a dialogue with this page, depth hermeneutic applies a 
mode of “scenic understanding” (Lorenzer 1970) in which the researcher is to use her/his 
own subjectivity—her/his own experiences and culturally formed expectations—in order to 
detect within him/herself the irritations arising from her/his relating to the text. 
Under standard methodological conditions, then, the task of a depth-hermeneutic inquiry 
into Facebook would be to detect and gather the irritations resulting from the researcher(s)’s 
reading of materials such as the comments on the Site Governance website. The selection 
made in this way is then ordered and systematised not according to cognitive categories, but 
relational and affective ones, specifically, the similarities in the forms that the researcher’s 
irritations have taken. Lorenzer here writes of “experiences of evidence” that are tied to inter-
action patterns: “It is the interaction patterns that allow us to recognize the most diverse ex-
periences as variations of one and the same scenic arrangement” (Lorenzer 1970, 144, our 
translation). The collection of material is continued in this way until the identification of typical 
interactional patterns has become saturated.  
Thus embarking on the methodological task of “scenic understanding”—a task which we 
have severely simplified for our summary here—we hope that the reader can see that this 
task is usually much less specific, as well as more open(-ended), than that of the present 
article, which is to detect, identify and describe alienation on SNSs. Simply put: while in a 
fully fledged depth-hermeneutic approach to Facebook identifying interaction patterns as 
alienated/alienating would be one possible outcome amongst others, we will direct our atten-
tion straightforwardly to those aspects in our material that can be linked to the conception of 
alienation that we put together from the pertaining literature above. 
The material that we have chosen for our demonstration is taken from the comment sec-
tion to the post “Thanks for your feedback” by Facebook’s Chief Privacy Officer, Erin Egan, 
posted on Facebook’s Site Governance website on 15 November, 2013. Egan’s post seeks 
to clarify the “changes we proposed recently to our Data Use Policy and Statement of Rights 
and Responsibilities” (Egan 2013, no page numbers) and obviously tries to deflect accusa-
tions put forth by commentators throughout the posts to the page: “We want you to know that 
                                                
3 German original: „Psychoanalyse hat die Aufgabe, die aus der Analyse objektiver gesellschaftlicher Prozesse   
abstrahierten Begriffe wie z.B. ‚Entfremdung‘ inhaltlich zu präzisieren in einem kritischen Verfahren, das von dem 
sinnlich-erfahrbaren Leiden der Subjekte ausgeht. Es gilt, konkretes Leiden in seiner ‚wirklichen‘ Genese zu hin-
terfragen, um an diesen Stellen eine ideologische Verschleierung des subjektiven Faktors, den erst Freud aufzu-
reiβen begann, zu durchschauen.“ (Lorenzer 1972, 15)  
4 https://www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance/app_4949752878 (accessed on 9 June, 2014). 
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nothing about this update has changed our advertising policies and practices. We heard this 
question a lot so we want to be clear. The goal of the update was to clarify language, not to 
change policies or practices” (Egan 2013, no page numbers, emphasis in original). From a 
thread containing 529 comments we looked at the first 100 (with the “Top Comments” func-
tion enabled); from those we chose six for further analysis. From such a relatively small 
number it is not possible to identify consistent patterns of interaction for the site. What we 
can and want to do nevertheless is to identify certain tendencies that might point us towards 
more consistent attitudes held on the site. 
A first such tendency can be accessed via a set of comments that compare Facebook to 
Google, the other Internet monopolist. A user named “Pvc Convoy” writes in the thread under 
Egan’s remarks: “At least Facebook tries to explain what is going on, UNLIKE GOOGLE” 
(Pvc. Convoy, 15/11/2013, 9.13pm), to which another user, Tim Mabry, seems to add loose-
ly: “At least it doesn't deceive like Google does” (Tim Mabry, 15/11/2013, 9.57pm). At the 
surface level, what are traded here are modes and quantities of an acute dissatisfaction on 
part of the users with the ways they are treated by social media services. More important, 
however, are the concrete forms that the articulations of this dissatisfaction take. In order to 
inquire into this, we would like to shift gears now and present some of our free associations 
in view of the material. This is a further methodological step of depth hermeneutics; Lorenzer 
suggests for a group of researchers to come together and freely associate to the collected 
material in order to refer these associations, as well as the group dynamics arising from the 
discussion—conflicts between researchers, shared emotional states, images, etc.—back to 
the material, making them fertile for the material’s interpretation; this being a methodological 
idea that Lorenzer borrowed from psychoanalytic group supervision (Lorenzer 1986, 43; 
Balint, 1964). 
5.1. A Pleasurable Sense of Importance 
For us the irritations emanating from the two comments above are related to the theatrical 
posture carried by word choices and choices of phrasing, such as “at least” or the high-case 
“UNLIKE GOOGLE”. What the two posts triggered in us were notions of juvenile intrigue and 
high school drama of the kind that one frequently encounters in US-American television se-
ries catering for teenagers. Facebook and Google appear to be cast in the roles of conniving, 
two-timing and coolly plotting lovers whose actions command their partners’ attention even in 
their absence. 
To be sure, this notion of juvenile drama is by no means intended as a characterisation of 
the commentators themselves; we do not have any more information about them than what 
can be gathered from the comments themselves. By contrast, our point is exactly to treat 
these comments as characteristic of the piece of symbolic interaction they are part of. Putting 
forth the notion of juvenile drama, then, is meant as a suggestion of a relevant character trait 
of the relation between Facebook and its users. Granting our two comments some paradig-
matic force, what this notion says about this relation is first of all that there is a high expecta-
tion of being fooled on part of these users and agreement amongst them about the platform’s 
reputation: “one just cannot trust it”. Clearly, the two comments show themselves to be hurt 
and disappointed. At the same time, however, there is an attempt to find solace in this by 
emphasising the residual good that can be found in the partner: “at least Facebook tries to 
explain” (although it does not succeed, one could add); “at least it doesn’t deceive” (although 
sometimes it comes close). The comparison of degrees of immorality renders the less im-
moral part tolerable and legitimate. 
Now, we are aware of how eccentric such formulations as the above ones will appear 
within a conventional academic paper; however, we find it important to demonstrate some of 
the free-associative material in order to work out the core point that we want to make about 
the two comments’ meaning for the relation between Facebook and its users. Specifically, we 
find that the lack and the deficiencies which the comments point to are not simply and exclu-
sively suffered as deficiencies but also enjoyed and celebrated to a degree for their value as 
scandals in which one is personally involved. It seems to us that the indignation that is being 
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enacted by those comments is experienced as partly pleasurable because it endows both, 
the ones articulating this indignation and those taken into confidence (the authors of this pre-
sent article, for example), not only with a sense of righteousness but, not least, with a sense 
of importance. Venting and calling forth feelings of indignation and having them acknowl-
edged and objectified is thus suffused with narcissistic pleasure. This seems to us to show 
parallels to a process of coming off age and joining the world of grown-ups, where personal 
relations have weight and importance and one’s actions real-life consequences. “Is this really 
happening to me? Is it really I who is part of this?” At the same time, this sense of maturity 
and importance emanating from the comments appears to be performed in a playful and 
somewhat inconsequential manner. Therefore, we feel that the kind of “deception” that the 
two comments deal with can and will be put aside if the deceiver only shows a quantity of 
remorse towards his/her partner(s). 
In compressed form, what we can thus identify in the pose of the two comments—
Lorenzer would call them “scenes” (1986, 60–62)—is a pleasurable, narcissistic sense of 
personal importance derived through the enactment of indignation over an experience of 
being deceived—an experience of impotence. Turned the other way around, what this con-
stellation could mean for the users’ relation with the Facebook platform is that there is a 
common experience of powerlessness, of being disappointed and hurt, that users render 
tolerable, even pleasurable, through a mutually affirming performance of indignation that 
serves to take the consequence—that of impotence, immorality, deception etc.—out of the 
perceived reality of the relation. 
Referring these observations back to Jaeggi’s definition of alienation, they allow us a 
glimpse of what shape the “relation of unrelatedness” (Jaeggi 2005, 19) might take on SNSs. 
In our two scenes a notion of meaninglessness announces itself in the exaggerated and cli-
chéd theatricality in which the comments fashion their indignation: “at least”, “UNLIKE 
GOOGLE”. However, the re-enactment of the relationship seems well rehearsed and devoid 
of spontaneity and it might just as well be such routine which protects the relation from the 
insight into its meaninglessness. This form of theatricality also takes the edge off one’s pow-
erlessness in the face of the platform’s actions. It distracts and glosses over the conse-
quences of one’s relation with the SNS, which would otherwise become fully perceivable and 
experiencable. 
5.2. Staging a Breakdown in Relations 
Giving our above findings of a notion of self-importance and its affirmative effects more relief, 
we can refer to another, very common type of post which is characterised by the staging of a 
breakdown in the relation with the SNS that is attacked: 
 
If my posts are glitched anymore..I mean they are actually taken away from me..I will 
file.a lawsuit against Facebook..my son is a former Atty General..and he is fantastic pros-
ecutor..I WILL FILE CHARGES WITH THE FED. TRADE COMM...I WILL HAVE THEM 
MONITOR MY POSTS AS I TYPE THEM..AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES..SICK OF 
YOUR LIBERAL CRAP..ARE YOU EVEN AMERICAN??????????????/ (Danny Allen, 
24/05/2014, 10:03am) 
 
Arguably, what one can identify here is an insight that realises in relational form what Fuchs 
and Sevignani (2013, 257) list as one of the aspects of alienation: “alienation from the ob-
jects/material of production” (ibid). After all, the user feels he has been robbed. The perse-
cuted and threatening feel of the post reaches far beyond its reference to consumer rights 
(“the Fed. Trade Comm.”) that are seen as being attacked by Facebook as a corporation. In 
its attempt at enlisting us (the authors of this paper) as supporters of its accusations and de-
nunciations, by seeking to convince us of its strength and authority (“my son is a former Atty 
General”), and by trusting us to share in its moral high ground (anti-liberal American) as well 
as its rage (“crap”), it achieved the exact opposite. Not only did the cultural differences be-
tween us (central European, left-leaning intellectuals) and this post make empathy hard to 
come by; moreover, its accusations we felt to be poorly informed—a lack of insight into how 
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Facebook works—its assurance of agency seemed to us a sure sign of powerlessness, its 
rage an unacceptable lack of control and composure, a demonstration of a deep, tormenting 
melancholia that we did not want to have a part in. 
Whereas in the first set of posts, discussed above, what we found is a show of indignation 
that is half-serious and inconsequential and, in this way, amounted for us to an enjoyable 
avoidance of the insight into one’s own powerlessness vis-à-vis the SNS, this post here 
brings its helplessness to the fore exactly in its attempt at acting up (and out) against the 
threat of meaninglessness and powerlessness that has befallen it. 
Another example containing a very similar interactional pattern comes from user “Justin O. 
Smith”. Posting a complaint about being harassed by one or more other users—a complaint, 
which once again slides quickly into “ALL CAPS” mode –, the post climaxes with “I MUST 
ASSUME THAT FACEBOOK HAS ENABLED THEM TO DO THIS, OTHERWISE___HOW 
IS IT POSSIBLE!” (Justin O Smith, 22/05/2014, 7:54pm, extract). What we find here again is 
screaming, outrage as a counterpart to the comparatively mild, (self)-ironic form of indigna-
tion above. Once more this outrage brings the mode of playing along to a halt which is main-
tained in the other set of posts. And once more powerlessness is articulated in the empty 
threat of contacting “the federal authorities if this sort of HARASSMENT of me continues”. 
Finally, in a parallel to the displacement of aggression towards liberalism (“liberal crap”) in 
the former post, we again find rage being channelled towards a conspiracy-theoretical object 
par excellence: “the FascIst-in-Chief___that piece of shit DESPOT OBAMA.” (Justin O 
Smith, 22/05/2014, 7:54pm, extract).  
Are these two last posts examples of a specific kind of alienated situation? The strong 
projective tendencies and conspiracy-theoretical fantasies at least point to a condition in 
which acute feelings of powerlessness and meaninglessness in one’s own innermost rela-
tions are fought off with considerably desperate means. Despite the posts’ strong affinities to 
some of the variables that Fuchs and Sevignani (2013) deduce from Marx’s four dimensions 
in Grundrisse (i.e. alienation from the instruments; alienation from the objects), it is not clear 
at all whether this enraging feeling of disorientation which is enacted here, is related to the 
structuration of labour on Facebook itself or rather to an inability to use the network in the 
way intended by its owners. This latter case would be one of lacking knowledge, rather than 
one of a deficiency in the relation to oneself and others due to one’s realisation of the specific 
relations of production on the SNS. 
5.3. A Reified Sense of Entitlement  
There is one more set of posts which we would like to discuss here and with which we would 
like to return to the sense of importance that struck us in the first set of posts that we pre-
sented. In the following posts we find that this sense of importance is frequently attached to 
another such sense, namely one of entitlement and worth. User “Steve Smith”, for example, 
shares a stylishly laid out message by a user or user group named “Social Fixer”. This mes-
sage provides a list of demands and instructions addressed to Facebook: “Dear facebook,” it 
reads, “The Newsfeed is getting worse! Here is what I want”, followed by instructions that are 
reasonable in content—e.g. “Posts in the order they were posted”—yet, at the same time, 
curiously impatient and familiar in form, e.g. “[I want] All my friends’ posts. Not just what you 
think I will like” (Smith, 08/12/2013, 10:46pm, our emphasis). In contrast to the second set of 
posts (staging a breakdown) there is no trace of acting out here; rather, one can draw com-
parisons to the initially discussed ones whose playful form of indignation also produced no-
tions of proximity and familiarity. Probably the clearest example of the relational aspect that 
we think is behind this intimate form of demanding things and the sense of entitlement that 
drives it comes from a user called “Sherry Mroczynski”, whose post takes on an additional air 
of the tragicomic and quixotic for us: 
 
Do not collect my data. Do not use my data without my specific hand written permission 
for each item. Do not release my personal information whether written of me by someone 
else or by me, past, present and future without my hand written permission or a court or-
der. If you do use my personal and private information I shall be notified immediately and 
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paid for it whether it was used previously or will be used in the future. I DO NOT AU-
THORIZE the use or collection of my personal information I have given to or shared with 
Facebook, past or present, which includes but is not limited to my messages, notifica-
tions, friends, texts, photos, images, comments or any other content contained in or on 
my profile or timeline including information I have shared on anybody's Facebook account 
whether current or deleted for any reason or purpose other than my own personal use 
and purpose of my Facebook account. I hereby declare that my copyright is attached to 
everything I have done and will ever do with my Facebook account and my handwritten 
consent is required at all times with no exception for any purpose other than my own re-
garding the information contained in it or on it. (Sherry Mroczynski, 05/04/2014, 5:54am) 
 
Needless to say, Mroczynski did in fact authorize the use of her personal information when 
she ticked off the terms and conditions agreement as part of the Facebook membership pro-
cedure. Therefore, her juridical tone—“I hereby declare”—is not endowed with the authority 
that this tone requires. The incongruence between the mode of speech and the actual posi-
tion of the one speaking produces the comic effect. Yet, what is important to us in this post is 
that the distribution of being deserving on part of the comment/commentator and an acute 
sense of obligation located on part of the other, i.e. Facebook, speaks of the same injury that 
we found present but glossed over in the posts above. The obsessive desire of being met in 
one’s demands down to the most minuscule detail seems to be a reaction to having been 
disappointed, utterly and beyond repair, and can thus be seen as a continuation of the indig-
nation performed in the first set of comments. In its repetitive phrasing of “do not” and its 
strong investment in the “handwritten”, the post takes on notions of what early psychoanalytic 
theory called hysteria, with the idea of the forbidden, catastrophic touch—“I have been 
soiled”—forming the implicit counterpart of the fetishistic idea of the “handwritten”—the touch 
of genius. In this way, then, Mroczynski’s post seems to conjure up the figure of a disap-
pointed, deceived lover who cannot bring him/herself to leave the deceiver; instead s/he con-
tinues the process of hollowing out the relationship by nagging, ranting, and dishing out in-
creasingly harsher rules of conduct, none of which can be expected to be truly followed or to 
truly change the deceiver’s morals, let alone mend the relationship.  
Also this last association is meant as an experimental insight into the relation between 
Facebook and its users and sheds light on the ways in which a lacking ability to identify with 
one’s actions on the SNS and an experience of powerlessness are articulated in it. In this 
last case, the relation is articulated in an immensely bloated self-image that seems to mis-
takenly use Facebook’s interest in the personally trivial and mundane (Fisher 2012, 177) for 
the bolstering of personal importance and exceptionality. 
5.4. Inverse Fetishism Revisited  
It is with this relational image in mind that we can return to Fuchs and Sevignani’s concept of 
“inverse fetishism” (2013, 261). As stated previously, this concept argues that users deny the 
reifying aspects in their relationship with Facebook by emphasising the social gratifications 
they receive from using the service. What our exemplary findings so far brought to the fore in 
this respect is first of all the aspect of denial, i.e. that the threatening insight of being exploit-
ed, coerced and alienated has to be fended off on a mental plane. However, in comparison 
to Fuchs and Sevignani’s example of “Facebook does not exploit me, because I benefit from 
it by connecting to other users”, people in our cases addressed the forlornness of their rela-
tion with Facebook full on; at the same time, however, they seemed to use this very perfor-
mance of indignation to (unconsciously) defend themselves against this knowledge. This 
means that, in our examples, what was defended against was not so much the knowledge of 
the deceiving, exploiting nature of Facebook itself, but of the consequences for the users 
arising from their partnership with Facebook. “Facebook exploits me, but that’s not so bad as 
long as I can benefit from it by connecting to other users.” 
John Steiner’s concept of “turning a blind eye” (1986) seems to offer an adequate umbrel-
la for the various ways of defending against knowledge which Fuchs and Sevignani as well 
as our own experimental reading of posts has brought forth. Steiner refers to this mechanism 
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as turning a blind eye because, as he writes, “I think this conveys the right degree of ambigu-
ity as to how conscious or unconscious the knowledge is. […] [W]e are vaguely aware that 
we chose not to look at the facts without being conscious of what it is we are evading” (Stei-
ner 1986, 161). Likewise, when Sebastian Sevignani writes that, “users are kind of aware 
that people who own and control the SNS are appropriating societally-produced surplus” 
(2013, 331, our emphasis), the phrase “kind of” seems to us to point to the very ambiguity 
that Steiner observes. 
Taking the theme of “inverse fetishism” one step further, we would like to suggest that the 
commodity form does not simply remain “hidden behind the social use-value of Facebook”, 
as Fuchs and Sevignani argue (2013, 261). Rather, it becomes identified with and enacted in 
the users’ interactions with the SNS. Vaguely knowing how dubious their relation with Face-
book is, the users’ exacting demands and instructions, which we detected in our third set of 
posts, can be read as attempts at selling themselves as dearly as possible to the platform 
owners: “Do this, not that”; “Don’t give me just what you think I like”; “Don’t touch anything 
without my handwritten permission” etc. It is against this interaction pattern that the notion of 
the diva is evoked: just as a diva’s mannerisms can be interpreted as acting up against a 
culture-industrial complex, which, paradoxically, is fed and reaffirmed by these actions, so 
can the exacting demands put forth in the comments we analysed be seen as means for the 
commentators to adapt to the corporate conditions of socialising on the platform and make 
themselves at home in an alienating, objectifying relation. “Well, if you want to instrumental-
ise me,” these comments seem to tell Facebook, “then at least treat me as a precious in-
strument and maintain me well!” 
5.5. Trade-Off Strategies and Narcissism in User-User Relations 
Against the above extension of the concept of inverse fetishism we can also gain a new per-
spective on the trade-off strategies that Sevignani (2013) identifies as sites of alienation. 
From his interviews with users, Sevignani learns that the only viable strategy for users to 
strike a balance between privacy needs and privacy threats is “to limit their information dis-
closure” (Sevignani 2013, 332). Building on this, from what we found in our cases of users 
directly addressing Facebook as an imagined/imaginary other, we are rather pessimistic as 
to the consequences of such trade-off strategies for user-user relations, since the probability 
seems high that a user’s sense of her/his commodification is also being worked into her/his 
interactions with other users. In this respect, a certain degree of narcissism, which users of 
SNSs are so often accused of falling prey to in popular journalism, seems system-inherent. 
Also such narcissism must be understood first and foremost as “a defence produced in re-
sponse to misrecognition”, as Aaron Balick explains from a relational psychoanalytic per-
spective (2014, 81). According to this perspective, then, the narcissist invests in a reified 
image of her/himself that is not entirely of her/his own making, but a coproduction between 
the platform and her/him, which works according to our description of instrumentalisation and 
self-reification above. Part of the trade-off thus seems to be a continuous, automated inspec-
tion of oneself along the lines of one’s own “preciousness”, not only with respect to one’s 
Facebook friends, but also against the vague intuition that one is feeding one’s own objectifi-
cation as well as the return of one’s data in disguise (Andrejevic 2011, 2014). 
6. Conclusion 
It was the task of this article to shed further light upon the concept of alienation and how it is 
experienced, as well as articulated in relational form online. For this purpose we made use of 
Marx’s early formulations on alienation in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844 and Rahel Jaeggi’s (2005) reading of the former. With Alfred Lorenzer’s method of 
scenic understanding (1970; 1986) we approached an exemplary selection of user posts to 
Facebook’s Site Governance Page. Let us pull together the various threads of our article’s 
argument by briefly reviewing our findings against the literature we used. 
While Fuchs and Sevignani (2013) observe apropos their concept of “inverse fetishism” 
(2013, 261) that the object status of users is hidden behind the use value, our experimental, 
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exemplary findings suggest, firstly, what form this latent objectification takes, secondly, what 
effects it might have on user-platform, as well as user-user relations. Thirdly, and conse-
quently, our findings suggest that this objectification does make itself felt in these relations 
after all. It is these point that will occupy us in the following passages. 
As might be an expected bias of posts to the Site Governance Page, we found them to be 
astonishingly aware of them being instrumentalised. Contrary to the ideal statement of “Fa-
cebook does not exploit me, because I profit from it by connecting to other users” (Fuchs and 
Sevignani 2013, 261), the postures taken in the posts we observed rather amounted to “Fa-
cebook does in fact exploit me, but that’s not so bad because I profit from it by connecting to 
other users.” Moreover, in a surprising realisation of Marx’s early dictum in the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts that the “estrangement of man […] is realized and expressed only 
in the relationship in which a man stands to other men” (Marx, 1844 [1956/2009], 32) these 
posts seem to realise their estrangement by establishing a quasi-personal relation to Face-
book. In the user experience, this notion of Facebook as a palpable Other seems to arise 
through what Andrejevic (2011) describes as the interchanging relation of users feeding data 
to the SNS and the SNS feeding these data back to the users in disguised form (through 
advertising, friend suggestions, selection of posts in the newsfeed, etc). It is in such mo-
ments, in which users obtain a glimpse of the SNS’s “latent desires” as well as their part in 
them—“...what you think I will like” (Social Fixer 2013)—that the impression of a certain 
character type arises, a type that the posts we looked at judged to be a chronically unfaithful, 
conniving lover—“one just cannot trust her/him”.  
However, despite the deep running mistrust towards Facebook which the posts demon-
strate, we thought to detect in this very demonstration a missing willingness and/or ability to 
put an end to the relation. The indignation expressed in the posts appeared to us to be 
strangely clichéd and theatrical—a theatricality that in turn suggested to us the opposite of 
acting upon a vivid insight. Specifically, the subjects speaking through these posts seemed to 
derive a pleasurable sense of importance from them being instrumentalised which seemed to 
help users “turn a blind eye” (Steiner 1986) and gloss over the consequences that their in-
strumentalisation has for them. This aspect of our findings also sheds new light on the dy-
namics of the concept of “ideological coercion” (e.g. Fuchs 2012, 732), specifically, that the 
repeated, mutual confirmation amongst users of being victims in the same intrigue takes the 
edge off the personal sense of powerlessness that the betrayal might otherwise have. In the 
cases we looked at it is thus the very articulation of indignation that serves as a safety valve 
and makes the continuation of the relation possible, if not pleasurable. “Oh, you know, it’s 
Facebook—What can you do?” In this relation-affirming staging of indignation we therefore 
find a moment of alienation from oneself and from others in that the removal of consequence 
from one’s relation with Facebook goes hand in hand with the removal of consequence from 
one’s own symbolic interaction.  
In this way, the relation with the deceiving partner is continued on the basis of a funda-
mental injury that has been derealised. Symptomatically, this injury shows in the increasingly 
impatient, at times literally hysterical demands with which the deceived unconsciously seeks 
to take revenge on, as well as control over, the partner and force upon him/her a compro-
mised display of appreciation. This symptomatic finding seems to go most clearly against 
Fuchs and Sevignani’s otherwise immensely fruitful concept of “inverse fetishism” (2013, 
261): having reached a certain level of frustration with Facebook as a partner, posts begin to 
display signs of a regressive, destructive and most importantly: self-destructive reification 
and instrumentalisation of the self. “If I am an instrument for you, then at least treat me like a 
prescious instrument!” It is in this protesting act of self-reification that Rahel Jaeggi’s reading 
of Marx’s definition of alienation can best be unfolded. When user “Sherry Mrocynski” dis-
plays a striking investment in the “handwritten” we can detect in her misconception of the 
value which she thus attributes to her symbolic produce that which Jaeggi calls “the inability 
to identify meaningfully with what one does and with whom one does it with” (Jaeggi 2005, 
30). By contrast, the hysterical notions of the forbidden touch—“do not...”—in the same post 
appear clearly related to what Jaeggi calls “the inability to exert control over what one does” 
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(ibid). Both dynamics are related and tied to one another and have their roots in the condi-
tions of production on the SNS. 
Extrapolating our findings, we scrutinised the thesis of “inverse fetishism” further, ques-
tioning in how far objectification would in fact remain hidden in user-user relations in the face 
of the symptoms that some of the posts to the Site Governance Page displayed. Drawing on 
the relational psychoanalytic conception of narcissism as a “defence produced in response to 
misrecognition” (Balick 2014, 81), we asked whether platform-driven objectification and in-
strumentalisation shows in user-user relations in the form of such narcissism. According to 
the definition presented here, narcissism can no longer be seen as a creation of which either 
the user or the SNS alone is responsible. Much rather, narcissism has to be understood as a 
co-creation between the users, the SNS, as well as the socio-cultural context within which a 
given user responds to the SNS’s capitalist agenda with acts of self-reification – acts which 
again will have been culturally, as well as biographically rehearsed (ibid, 79). In order to say 
more about what Stephen M. Johnson calls the “narcissistic style” (1987) and its potential for 
online alienation, further studies will be necessary. These studies will have to take into con-
sideration not only the relations of production on online SNS, but, as Aaron Balick cautions, 
both the wider “culture and family constellations” (2014, 79). 
Rounding off the review of our findings, we see that it was only in the most extreme articu-
lations of frustrations with the SNS—articulations that nevertheless can be seen as typical 
topoi in online discourse—that the state of alienation described above (a state which in all 
other posts observed was maintained in the continual hollowing out of the relationship) could 
be seen to break down. Even though we are unsure in these cases as to what degree we 
can relate the breakdown to the posts’ relation to the SNS directly, the disorientation as well 
as the strong projective responses tied to this disorientation appear characteristic of the re-
lease of psychic energy that was formerly bound by a (self-)destructive relationship. As dif-
ferent as these incidents of acting out might seem from the milder forms of indignation expe-
rienced in the other posts, they can still be placed on the same continuum. While the posts 
that remained attached to the SNS turned this SNS into a quasi-person in order to enter into 
what psychoanalysis calls a “family romance”, the posts staging a breakdown in relations had 
to rely on a concrete counterpart. In the open confrontation with their powerlessness vis-a-vis 
the network, these latter posts set up characteristically conspiracy-theoretical objects for their 
projections, for example “the FascIst-in-Chief___that piece of shit DESPOT OBAMA” (Justin 
O. Smith, 22/05/2014, 7:54pm, extract). 
In an article from the late 1990s, the German social psychologist Gerhard Vinnai analysed 
the affectively charged “family romances” that people in Germany created in relation to Prin-
cess Diana after her tragic death in a car accident in Paris in 1997. People fantasised them-
selves to be on intimate terms with the “people’s princess”, reporting her to be like a sister, a 
mother, daughter, best friend, etc. Vinnai interprets these romantic fantasies as compromise 
constructions: in a socio-cultural, socio-economic set up in which people can no longer see 
through the complexity of the socio-cultural and socio-economic relations of the world, these 
romances help them make sense of their own place within them—albeit in a precariously 
regressive and reductive way.  
 
The tendency of falling back behind once secured stages of social emancipation has its 
counterpart in a dubious urge for the familiar. That people should turn into social beings, 
that they should become culturally and politically enabled, demands the loosening of 
childish ties to one’s family origins. It demands that one leave behind the limited orienta-
tion towards the family in favour of becoming interested in more complex social interrela-
tions. The urge to escape from burdening social realities facilitates the regression to fa-
miliar experiences of relations that are then transferred to social structures for which they 
are not adequate (Vinnai 1998, no page numbers, our translation). 
 
We feel that this theme of family romantic relations standing in for and covering up a much 
harsher political-economic reality is highly applicable to the users’ relations to Facebook and 
has been an undercurrent in nearly all our observations on online alienation. It is in light of 
these family romances that we deem Fisher’s (2012) neat equation of more-exploitation-less-
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alienation to be in need of revision. Arguably, social networking online might help a large 
number of people strengthen their social ties. However, while the generation of exchange 
value from these networking activities remains mostly hidden to the users, it remains all but 
ineffective. 
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